

SECRET

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

12 January 1961

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[Redacted]

Tshombé has threatened military action against the invaders and reportedly has denounced the UN-arranged ceasefire in northern Katanga. He would have difficulty operating among the hostile tribes of northern Katanga.

Tension is high in both the European and African communities in Elisabethville. Tshombé may be unwilling to move too many troops out of the Elisabethville area for fear of giving the large Baluba population there an opportunity to revolt. As a result of mutinies among his African troops, he is recruiting Europeans

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In Leopoldville, the prestige of the Kasabubu-Mobutu government has been further damaged by the inability of Mobutu's forces to take effective action against the dissidents. A police mutiny, which began on 10 January over pay, seems to be spreading to the armed forces in the area, whose morale, already low as a result of alleged favoritism shown by Mobutu towards some units, reportedly has suffered further as a result of the continued success of the opposition forces. The American ambassador in Leopoldville believes that continued erosion of Mobutu's prestige, coupled with army unrest, may lead to an early Lumumba takeover.

At their meeting in Casablanca from 4 to 7 January, the pro-Lumumba states of Morocco, Mali, Ghana, Guinea, and the UAR adopted a resolution on the Congo asserting their determination to withdraw their troops from the UN Command and reaffirm-

ing their recognition of Lumumba's government. The resolution called for the UN to disarm Mobutu's "lawless gangs," release all political prisoners, reconvene parliament, and deport all "Belgians and foreigners" not part of the UN operation.

Nkrumah of Ghana reluctantly agreed to join the other states in the projected troop withdrawal, but both he and Moroccan King Mohammed V resisted pressure, principally from Nasir of the UAR, to recognize the Gizenga government and assign their troops to support it. However, the maintenance in the Congo--especially in Orientale Province--of a large force independent of the UN is beyond the present logistic and financial capabilities of the African states alone. No date was announced for the threatened withdrawal, but the chiefs of state reportedly agreed that if the UN has not met their demands by the end of January, they will "set up machinery for restoring Lumumba to power." Guinean President Touré on 11 January formally requested the withdrawal of his country's UN contingent by 20 January.

On 7 January the USSR called for a meeting of the Security Council--now scheduled for 12 January--to discuss "new acts of aggression" by Belgium against the Congo and the "gross violation" of the international status of Ruanda-Urundi. A Soviet Government statement of 11 January demanded the liquidation of Belgium's rights and powers in Ruanda-Urundi, the withdrawal of all Belgian personnel in the Congo, and other "measures to normalize the situation," including the release of Lumumba. The statement requested Security Council discussion of these questions and, "if need be," also an emergency session of the General Assembly.

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EAST-WEST RELATIONS

At the Cuban National Day reception on 2 January, Khrushchev said the delay in establishing contact with the new US administration was largely responsible for the Soviet party's decision to postpone its 22nd congress until October

At the same reception First Deputy Premier Mikoyan remarked that Khrushchev did not expect to meet with President-elect Kennedy until "perhaps July."

This link between the timing of the party congress and top-level East-West talks suggests that Khrushchev hopes to achieve some tangible diplomatic success which could be used to demonstrate the validity and effectiveness of his foreign policy before committing the Soviet party to the kind of authoritative and long-range programs that are enunciated by party congresses. The Soviet leaders may also feel that the Chinese Communist challenge makes it imperative that the party congress take unequivocal positions on doctrinal as well as foreign policy questions, and that this will be impossible until the Soviet leaders have an opportunity to assess the character and likely moves of the new US administration.

The new date for the party congress--17 October--and Mikoyan's reported reference to a meeting with the new US President in July suggest that the Soviet leaders are aware that the process of arranging a summit conference will require considerably more time than Khrushchev indicated in earlier private remarks. In talks with Prime Minister Macmillan last

fall, Khrushchev mentioned February and March as possible dates for a summit; later he indicated to the West German ambassador that April would be the deadline for talks on Germany.

Moscow's relative restraint on Berlin which was evident in the Communist position during the negotiations renewing the Soviet and East German trade pacts with Bonn was again reflected in Moscow's reply to the US note of 26 October protesting East German statements and actions concerning Berlin. The Soviet note of 7 January was brief, devoid of polemic, and merely confirmed the Soviet position as presented in the 26 September note. In response to an earlier US protest, the USSR declared at that time that East Germany exercised full power on the territory lying under its sovereignty, "including in its capital."

The brevity of the latest Soviet note also appears intended to close out the exchange over East German restrictions on West German travel into East Berlin.


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FRANCE-ALGERIA

De Gaulle now will press forward with his plan to establish an interim administrative framework in Algeria, following the mandate he received as a result of the referendum.



The referendum results have been hailed by French Government spokesmen as a resounding vote of confidence in De Gaulle, and the low negative vote has dismayed European settlers and their rightist supporters in France. Metropolitan "yes" voters may be disappointed,

to rebel demands for a precipitate withdrawal of the French Army from Algeria. However, De Gaulle may try to ease the way into negotiations by defining a plan for Algerian autonomy that would tempt the rebel leadership.

The rebels feel overtures should come from Paris. While there are indications that rebel premier Ferhat Abbas is willing to reach a reasonable negotiated settlement, he may continue to be overruled by extremist members of the PAG. The rebel government's representative in Beirut reportedly stated last week that Abbas wanted negotiations to begin immediately after the referendum. Abbas was said to fear that if De Gaulle continued to insist on a ceasefire as a condition to substantive negotiations, the situation would deteriorate to the point where the FLN would accept Soviet and Chinese Communist aid.

FRANCE - ALGERIA

(MILLIONS OF VOTES)

6-8 JAN. REFERENDUM	METROPOLITAN FRANCE	ALGERIA	TOTAL
YES	15.20	1.75	16.95 (54.2)* (74.5)**
NO	5.00	.78	5.78 (18.5) (25.5)
INVALID BALLOTS	.61	.11	.72 ( 2.3)
ABSTENTIONS	6.04 (23)*	1.77 (40)*	7.81 (25.0)
REGISTERED VOTERS	26.85	4.41	31.26


1958 CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM	METROPOLITAN FRANCE	ALGERIA
YES	17.67	3.59
NO	4.62	.12
ABSTENTIONS	4.01 (15.1%)	.94 (20.1%)

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\* PERCENT OF REGISTERED VOTERS  
\*\* PERCENT OF VALID BALLOTS

12 JANUARY 1961

however, in their anticipation that De Gaulle will move quickly to political negotiations with the rebels as he intimated he would do in his pre-referendum campaign speeches.



De Gaulle is prepared to negotiate with the provisional Algerian government (PAG). He continues to insist, however, that rebel terrorism must cease first, and he is firmly resolved not to accede

Any negotiations will be difficult, as the rebels may object to the safeguards that De Gaulle will insist upon for the European minority, or to the French intention to separate the oil-rich Sahara from the coastal departments. The defiant attitude of Algeria's urban Moslems, moreover, may encourage the rebels to maintain a standoffish attitude.

Meanwhile, there has been a new outbreak of anti-French feeling in the independent Arab states, based partly on French policies toward Algeria and partly on recent reports of French assistance in developing

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
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Israel's nuclear capability. The UAR has taken the lead, demanding that all Arab governments sever relations with France and set up an area-wide boycott. The Cairo-dominated International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions on 11 January called on all Arab workers to boycott

French ships, planes, and goods.



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